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In this paper, we explored the effect of time on people’s prospective memory intentions and 
their cognitive abilities when making memory predictions. Although retention interval was 
the experimental variable in between phases of our experiments, we modified the intensity of 
the ongoing activity and the sources of the prospective activities in experiment one and two. 
Thus, we conducted two experiments: in experiment one participants generated future 
intentions and predicted their performance; in experiment two participants performed a more 
compelling task while instructed and tested about the prospective tasks that had to be 
remembered. In both experiments respondents had to recall the future intentions on later 
stages. Generally we found that time has a negative impact on memory. There is a strong 
decay in memory after 30 minutes and not much further decay after 60 minutes. We also 
observed that people’s predictions about their memory don’t take into account the effect of 
time interval on memory.  Our objectives were to contribute to the existing literature on 
human metacognition through testing prospective memory performance, predictions and 
fluency before and during the execution of future intentions. Furthermore, the present thesis 
attempted to corroborate the use of advertising and promotion in order to maintain vivid the 
desire and the need to buy products in consumers’ minds, as they fail to predict that their 
memory decays over short periods of time. People forget faster than they anticipate and are 
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In introducing the concept that rationality and consciousness are two limited but malleable 
human traits (Simon, 1990), we inexorably soared the lengthy and intricate literature of 
human logic and memory functions, when approaching situations of decision making and 
planning. The constructivist bond existing between reasoning and memory, moulded by the 
surveillance of human intelligence (Piaget & Inhelder, 1973), appraises people’s 
(meta)cognitive abilities in terms of their monitoring and control functions, in particular the 
correctedness and the informativeness properties of their information reports. On the basis of 
the observations stemming from this theoretical view, we stress out the importance of 
people’s complex cognitive system, which shapes human behaviour among different 
circumstances and contexts, that ultimately is responsible for the generation and execution of 
everyday goals and plans. When digging into the working memory model (see Baddeley, 
1986) and then looking for an understanding of the practices that characterise people’s 
planning intentions and their relative strategies, we find ourselves exploring the basics and 
means of prospective memory. 
 
This work concerns people’s prospective memory abilities when dealing with day-to-
day situations on the face of decision making and action. Although previous research has 
focused for the most on retrospective memory and the relevancy of an event’s information for 
efficient decision making processes (Yaniv & Foster, 1995), the paradigms depicted for 
prospective memory research have been developed. The term prospective memory involves a 
complex range of cognitive processes in addition to memory that, inevitably, fall into the 
standard hypothesis of constructivism that reasoning is a key factor in trimming people’s 
memory abilities (Gero, 2008). Fortunately, later theorists have offered new and interesting 
ideas about how the cognitive system is affected by thought and reason, so to demonstrate that 
prospective actions are remembered and executed at appropriate times in the future. These 
ideas are comprised within the broader classes of attentional monitoring and spontaneous 
retrieval. The first subject embraces the view that in order to perform an intended action at a 
specific time in the future, the environment must be checked or monitored for signals (Smith 
& Bayen, 2004); the second subject presumes that prospective remembering in everyday 
2 
 
settings relies on less voluntary and less demanding cognitive processes (McDaniel & 
Einstein, 2007). 
It is very challenging to obtain objective experimental evidence on these topics but, before 
turning to our research, we tried to respect as much as possible the scientific study paradigm 
and parameters that have been developed to investigate prospective memory while designing 
our experiments. In particular, Figure1 (see Appendix) displays the major elements that have 
been followed in this paper. Within this paradigm, all sorts of prospective memory tasks can 
be implemented (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). 
 
The upshot of this research is that, once a person creates or collects intentions, 
memory and cognitive judgment strategies do not undertake the same path for the near future, 
but they follow disparate routes over short time intervals. One reason why this phenomenon 
has found wider ground of interest and research stems from the closely related area of 
consumer behaviour in the marketing field. In fact, the process of making consumer decisions 
and implementing these decisions can greatly influence people’s conduct when they have to 
perform an action (i.e. a purchase). Gollwitzer and Sheeran (2009) talk about self-regulatory 
strategies when people form intentions and translate those intentions into action on the edge 
of receiving information (stimuli) of a product, brand or promotion. Furthermore, Guynn 
(2003) suggests that upon forming an intention, consumers put consciously themselves in a 
prospective retrieval mode. However, for everyday settings we believe that for very short 
periods of time, mostly circumscribed within one hour time, consumers forget portions of 
their initial intentions and fail to predict that their memory will not remember every single 
action they planned to perform. Based on the findings of our analysis, a focused link with the 
marketing management practice will be finally asserted. 
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2. Philosophy of social research 
 
 
In this introductory section we aim at highlighting briefly the philosophical orientation and 
methodology of the researcher in his attempt to understand people’s memory and cognitive 
abilities. First, we will explain the philosophical position, which is adopted throughout the 
study and what are its main characteristics; second, we will offer a brief review about the 
methodologies used while conducting the research. 
 
Throughout the entire research the experimenter adopts a perspectivist position, “a 
thesis that expresses a naturalistic understanding of the human… …conditioned by the 
biological, psychological, cultural and linguistic background in which we are embedded” 
(Simpson, 2012, p. 7). This theoretical stance is characterised by the rejection of a systematic 
reality view of the world and its knowledge of it, but agrees with the idea that the nature of 
things are described by the eyes of the beholder (Kinash, 2010). In our study, the researcher 
believes that he studies and analyses an environment where people are living and performing 
ordinary activities. The phenomena stemming from his study are considered to spring from 
the researcher’s ability to stop and penetrate the cognitive and unconscious paradigms of 
people’s mental processes of generating (or collecting) prospective intentions of future 
actions and their planning strategies. 
 
The methodology used in the research involves qualitative approaches to the collection 
of data, but it also follows quantitative analysis methods to its description. In particular, the 
methods encompass anthropological techniques, which include the choice of collecting 
information from interviewing and observing people (Bernard, 1998), and analytic 
techniques, which follow the adoption of statistical analysis of the data. Throughout, the 
thesis features an abductive approach in relation to the description of the findings (truth) 
about the psychological aspects and characteristics of human memory and behaviour. In fact, 
as Fann (1970) described the defining characteristics of an abductive approach, the premises 
made do not guarantee a general conclusion applicable to different contexts from those of the 
study. Thus, the researcher believes that his findings are significant when dealing with similar 
situations that have distinguished his research, but he is less confident on his findings when 
studying and interpreting very different contexts of analysis. 
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Although we decided to study people’s memory and learning in everyday life contexts, the 
researcher expects the same results for consumption and purchase tasks that show similar 
environments and time requirements of those of his experiments. 
 
In his attempt to study people’s memory and cognitive processes, the researcher 
reflects about constructivism and agrees with past research ideologies that reasoning and 
memory are strongly glued by human intelligence. The constructivist view held in the paper is 
such that the knowledge about people’s cognitive abilities, that has been developed by many 
scholars over the past decades, is considered to be socially constructed: its meaning is created 
by shared understanding or interpretation of its nature (Ackermann, 1995). In fact, after many 
researchers have found analogous results in their own studies on the subject, our researcher 
believes in past findings’ relevancy; thus, he tries to follow and continue past empirical 
studies on people’s memory and cognitive abilities in order to progress and develop new 
findings on people’s decision making processes and planning strategies. 
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3.    Literature Review 
 
 
3.a Human rationality and intelligence 
 
One of the most intriguing topics that have come over economists and psychologists in the 
past century is human rationality and its bond to decision making. Generally, the branch of 
consumer behaviour that has for so long captured researchers’ attention looked to modern 
mainstream theories that assume people make their choices, and act consequently, in a way to 
maximise their utility (Simon, 1990). As fascinating as this argument can be it must be scaled 
down to seize the meaning of how any problem of everyday life is faced and managed. More 
specifically, the cognitive capabilities which describe human behaviour are bounded by limits 
that have for common denominator the idea that memory capacity can hold restricted amount 
of information in the short term and long term interval. Factors such as the environment in 
which the information is processed, the nature of the material processed, cognitive abilities 
and cognitive beliefs (and more) all play an important role in defining the rational limitations 
of each individual involved in a decision making situation. Consistent with this, previous 
research in consumer behaviour has shown that memory is a key factor that drives consumers’ 
choices (e.g., Hauser & Wernerfelt, 1990; Janiszewski, Kuo, & Tavassoli, 2012; Nedungadi, 
1990; Pechmann & Stewart, 1990). This is because if a certain product is not considered at the 
time of purchase it is likely not to be bought (Hauser & Wernerfelt 1990; Mitra & Lynch 
1995). What is essential to understand in order to expand and visualise the focus of the 
present research is that memory is a crucial ingredient, if not key, for reasoning and 
intelligence. The philosophical field that investigates this matter, known as constructivism, 
sees logic itself as reliant on the relationship between reasoning and memory; as Piaget and 
Inhelder (1973) appraised “the schemata used by the memory are borrowed from the 
intelligence” (in Fuzzy-trace Theory, Piaget & Inhelder, p. 3).  
On the assumption that rationality is a function of the skills and knowledge of each 
individual (Simon, 1990) intelligence can be either fixed or malleable. Those who believe 
intelligence is a fixed entity tend to accredit their performances to innate abilities whereas 
those who consider it an incremental unit attribute their performances to effort as well as 
cognitive abilities (Miele et al., 2011). The importance of this discussion is embedded in the 
recent researchers’ interest in metacognition and the evolution of human consciousness 
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(Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). The term metacognition refers to the ability to assess one’s 
own future memory so to supervise and address specific goals, where its achievement depends 
upon the actions taken afterwards (Nelson & Narens, 1990). Accordingly, the ground floor for 
the empirical enquiry conducted on human intelligence and memory is paved on two major 
functions of metacognition: the monitoring and control functions. The basic notion behind the 
monitoring mechanism of memory is that it assesses the correctedness of potential memory 
responses to specific circumstances where, complementary to this function of memory, the 
control mechanism determines whether or not the most accurate (best) memory response 
available to the subject needs to be reported (Goldsmith et al., 2002). The speculative 
theoretical framework on metamemory developed by Nelson and Narens (1990) attracts vast 
attention to the study of consumers and their behaviour when we realise that the cognitive 
system which bears the monitoring and control processes is also responsible for the formation 
of goals and plans in everyday life. The literature discusses and stresses the role of 
metacognitive skills in transferring the awareness of one’s cognitive processes to the design 
of practical solutions when facing learning and planning activities (Koriat & Bjork, 2006). 
Thus, it is necessary to understand the means with which people’s cognitive beliefs operate in 
order to comprehend the mental practices on planning that lead to action. It is important to 
remember that metamemory and the strategies that follow about monitoring and control 
memory functions are a unique characteristic for each individual examined, as well as for the 
reasoning and intelligence views presented earlier. 
 
 
3.b Battle between the naturalistic and laboratory research  
 
Most of the research on planning and mental rehearsal has been concerned with how 
memory performs in accordance with the environment and the situation in which is used. It is 
particularly true that metamemory functions and schema are influenced by the external factors 
that define the background and setting of where the information is encoded (Koriat et al., 
2006). The share of research that has encountered debate over the what, the how and the 
where memory phenomena should be studied concerns proponents of the naturalistic research 
opposed to supporters of the laboratory study. The dispute entails the characteristics of the 
traditional laboratory research defined in terms of storehouse concept of memory as opposed 
to everyday memory research defined in terms of correspondence metaphor of memory 
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(Cohen & Conway, 2008). In Koriat and Goldsmith paper (1996) on memory metaphors the 
idea of investigating and analysing memory as a cable link between what a person reports and 
the facts that have actually occurred (correspondence metaphor) permits to conceive the 
conception of memory as a representation or description about some past event. Thus, 
essential to this explanation and definition of memory there is the ability of people to 
faithfully report events by being evaluated in terms of accuracy¸ content and quality 
(informativeness) of reports. All of these aspects of the correspondence metaphor find robust 
affinity with the everyday memory research in which what is remembered is not less 
important than how much. The storehouse metaphor, in contrast, conceptualises memory as a 
storage space strongly related to the list-learning paradigm in which input elements 
(information) are deposited in a warehouse where later will be retrieved (Koriat & Goldsmith, 
1996). Here, the measure of memory is merely concerned with the number of units of 
information that can be recalled at a later stage.  
 
The line of thinking in which the correspondence metaphor is located makes a lot of 
sense when memory needs to be applied for complex events, places and conversations where 
people have freedom to opt for absolute correctedness or only approximately correct answers. 
The factors that administrate control of accuracy are well suited for specific categories of 
situations, such as witness memory (Cohen & Conway, 2008). For the purposes of our 
research we will attribute stouter importance to the storehouse concept of memory. A 
quantity-oriented approach to memory will be experimented and later discussed so to measure 
the effect of different retention intervals after an initial encoding phase. 
 
Proceeding on the battle between naturalistic studies as opposed to laboratory studies 
it is critical to introduce the concept of prospective memory. Prospective memory refers to 
remembering to convey intended actions at a particular point in the future (McDaniel & 
Einstein, 2007). Daily tasks and exercises which require even minimal reflection such as pick 
up the newspaper on the way to work or the mail in the mailbox when coming home are 
inextricably bound with prospective memory. Briefly, prospective memory is remembering to 
do something at an appropriate time in the future. Though, to perform an intended activity one 
must recall there was an intention and also the ways to execute it (retrospective memory). In 
everyday environments both of these memory components are adopted and implemented, but 
there is difficulty among metamemory researchers in finding accordance on the way memory 
should be studied. Laboratory study supporters score high both in representativeness and 
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generalisability whether we follow the concept of ecological validity described by 
Kvavilashvili and Ellis (2004) in their paper on the subject. Through representativeness it is 
meant the extent to which the information encoded (or the situation) resemble a real event in 
everyday living context. Generalisability it is referred to the degree the findings of a specific 
experiment are applicable to other similar real situations. By using these criteria the authors 
explicate that real-world research is more likely to fail mostly because of the lack of control 
over the external factors which characterise the environment of analysis. So, the incapability 
of generalisation due to the distinctive and inescapable context in which the research is 
conducted significantly limits the potential of naturalistic enquiry. Nevertheless, in spite of 
the undeniable advantages of laboratory research, many contemporary researchers moved 
outside the laboratory. The amount of research that has been done on a naturalistic setting 
stimulated controversy about the methods on memory exploration (Winograd, 1994). By 
remaining on the highlighted subject of the environment and its influence on the research 
methodology (and analysis) it is also necessary to agree with the view that any explanation of 
performance or behaviour of any memory system must account for the variables of the 
moment. It is in fact the memory’s job to encode, organize and set up the information in a 
way to make it available for the immediate or later use. Recall of specific task details from 
memory depends on context and external cues and much of the subject’s knowledge is 
acquired during a specific activity within a unique task environment (Alterman, 1996). The 
typical approach to examine prospective memory on a natural setting is, then, to observe 
people’s success in carrying out intentions in the future without influencing or altering the 
space and time in which their intentions are performed. The nature of this research enables 
metamemory students to look at how people handle prospective memory demands; it also 
enables researchers to scrutinize planning and hierarchical organization of the intentions 
which are extremely hard to read in the laboratory (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). 
 
The bottom line to this quarrel is that the phenomena of memory are so miscellaneous 
that there is no single set of methods that is of better adoption to the exclusion of others. 
Laboratory research on prospective memory is really useful for testing theories and for 
predicting real world circumstances although there may be key features of real world 
prospective memory activities which are tough to capture in a typical laboratory paradigm 
(McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). At date, theories and findings developed in laboratory guide the 
search for analogues in everyday situations, and the discoveries stemming from naturalistic 
studies are backed up by in lab experiments. As concluded by Cohen and Conway (2008) on 
9 
 
the matter a hybrid methodology has become commonplace among memory scholars. Others 
suggest that researchers use a laboratory experiment to test a hypothesis and replicate it in a 
field experiment that resembles the situations simulated in the lab experiment. This is because 
the lab experiment is internally valid. That is, potential confounds are controlled for. The field 
experiment is then necessary to show that the effect exists in reality.  
 
On the present paper there will be a strong focus on prospective memory, and so in 
looking to participants’ intentions to perform specific actions in the future, but it will keep a 
retrospective aspect on its endeavor too. The research, in respect to the conclusions drawn 
upon the practices and methodologies derived by the literature, will fall into the category of 
naturalistic enquiry. Our decision to perform an experiment not in laboratory but in the field 
does not specifically support one option to the other, it simply adjusts to the time and space 
constraints of our possibilities and research design. However, we believe that there is enough 
evidence from laboratory experiments to derive our hypotheses. And, thus, a field experiment 
is recommended to test them in real life. 
 
 
3.c Working memory and cognitive abilities 
 
Over the last 50 years there has been an incremental evolution regarding the question 
whether memory should be referred as a unitary system or whether it should be decomposed 
in a complex structure with different divisions and purposes. From the mid-70’s it was 
spreading the idea that memory couldn’t run with a singular model picture, as studies coming 
from brain-damaged patients appeared to show a disruption between the ability to build new 
long lasting memories and completing tests, which instead required short term recollection of 
information (Baddeley, 1992). In pursuing this hypothesis, several results from memory 
experimentation on cognitive skills such as reading, reasoning and comprehension have been 
obtained and the concept of a working memory system has gradually substituted the older 
concept of a unique memory division. Working memory appears then to be focal to many 
traits of human behaviour as primary as consciousness, rationality and learning. The 
architecture of the working memory model is organized mainly in three components: the 
central executive, the phonological loop and the visuo-spacial sketchpad (Baddeley, 1986). In 
brief, the central executive has the duty to regulate and coordinate the flow of material to be 
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stored and retrieved; it performs storage and processing maneuvers by keeping a flexible but 
limited capacity. The phonological loop retains information encoded in verbal form (i.e. 
speech-based information) for a short term interval; it comprises a store and a rehearsal 
control process. Finally, the visuo-spacial sketchpad is specialised for screening the 
information that can be embodied in forms of either its spacial or visual characteristics 
(Morris & Gruneberg, 1994). 
 
The reasons that brought to our discussion the description of this model are related to 
the nature of human rationality and consciousness. In particular, the fact that attention, type of 
information, priori and posteriori knowledge and environment are entailed in an intricate web 
of connections may lead to miss the processes which describe human memory. In fact, 
people’s brains tend to accumulate and place memory materials in memory nodes, which then 
connect and associate with priori knowledge and experiences through interconnecting links 
(Anderson & Bower, 1973). This chain of relationships between components of cognition, 
reasoning skills and environmental factors require a flexible picture of memory that is able to 
combine both the general purpose resources (provided by the central executive) and the 
specialised processing and storage functions of memory (managed by the phonological loop 
and the sketchpad). One of the best ways to understand this picture of memory and translate it 
into a helpful tool for the analysis of individuals’ cognitive processes and abilities is by 
looking into the means and methods people use when reporting information. Goldsmith et al. 
(2002) had conducted deep research on the subject by focusing on personal control over 
report options, which look at how individuals use the option “to volunteer or withhold 
answers in the service of enhancing one’s accuracy” (Goldsmith et al., 2002, p. 73). In their 
specific study they have focused on the two alternatives of free report versus forced report 
while testing memory on an open/closed list of general knowledge questions. The 
discriminant between the two was pinpointed by the freedom given to participants to choose 
whether to answer the questions in a specific manner or in a generic one. What is interesting 
and relevant for our purposes is that when people choose the option of free report they adjust 
memory accuracy and sacrifice quantity. Thus, we find that people use in a strategic manner 
the theoretical working model of memory that has been discussed. The phonological loop and 
sketchpad, responsible for the acquisition and storage of data, participate in a monitoring 
function of memory where the correct (or relevant) piece of information is stocked and 
assessed for future remembering (or not) in the short term (Baddely, 1992). The other 
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memory function responsible for determining the utilization of the best piece of information 
held, the control function, is performed by the central executive. 
 
If we speculate on the idea that working memory mechanics and report options have a 
strong connection when dealing with information that has a short time span (from collection 
to recall) we could reach the hypothesis that people’s rationality on everyday memory is about 
building structures of encoding and retrieval that are related to goals and their achievement 
(Anderson, 1996). Yet, the discussion relative to the construction of operative everyday goals 
and their execution yields concerns on the prospective memory topic earlier presented. 
According to Graf and Uttl (2001), intentions of actions that are retained in working memory 
can be distinguished between vigilant tasks and prospective tasks where the first ones are 
involved in monitoring the prospective intentions and the second ones are planned activities 
to be later performed. 
 
In an everyday context where multiple variables play a role in influencing and 
impacting people’s attention it is plausible to imagine a complex system of interconnected 
wires and nodes in memory’s architectural structures. Maintaining short term memories and 
representations in the face of numerous variables and distractions from other ongoing 
activities relies on working memory abilities, as well as planning of intended actions (Rose et 
al., 2010). Hence, situations that request for an equilibrium between environment and a set of 
tasks in working memory comprise identical types of attentional control procedures as the 
ones of prospective memory tasks.  
In our study we look at prospective memory tasks that need to be recalled within a 
short period of time, and so involving working memory functions in the process of storage 
and retrieval. The environment maintained its natural settings and participants performed an 
ongoing activity. We tried to keep a busy and naturalistic scenario so that participants had to 
engage in an unconscious process of organization and association of the information collected 






3.d Cognitive beliefs and confidence 
 
One of the best reasons to study metacognition (awareness on one’s own cognitive 
processes) derives from its potential to play a central part in guiding how people learn, how 
they organize information and what causes action (Kornell & Metcalfe, 2006). In order to 
reach part of the central engine of such potential metacognition has often been observed by 
soliciting predictions of memory performance, especially through judgments of learning 
(JOLs) that are formulated right after some information has been acquired or after some delay. 
JOLs may be measured on the basis of absolute accuracy which is the correspondence 
between memory predictions and memory performance, or on the basis of relative accuracy 
which refers to the degree JOLs differentiate between what is and what is not remembered 
(Rhodes & Tauber, 2011). In an important research executed by Nelson and Dunlosky (1991) 
when made after a time interval, JOLs were better at discriminating among items with low or 
high probability of being remembered than when JOLs were said immediately. This terrific 
discovery had several lines of support from the fact that people can make better memory 
predictions after a delay because they rely on information from their long term memory. 
However, on the immediate judgment side it has been found that several dissociations exist 
between predicted performance of recall and actual performance: one overestimates his own 
future memory performance because of an overconfidence bias that occur, typically, when the 
question and the answer are both at disposal of the subject when making a prediction 
(foresight bias or perspective bias) (Koriat & Bjork, 2005). Koriat and Bjork (2004) have also 
examined the hypothesis that JOLs may be governed by processing fluency during the 
encoding information phase on the basis of the experiences or beliefs about one’s cognitive 
abilities (see also Koriat & Ma’ayan, 2005). Hence, the investigation continued into the 
heuristics bases of metacognitive judgments when learning new items or material and, in the 
past decade, an alternative cue-utilization hypothesis in metacognitive judgments has gained 
impetus. According to this assumption JOLs are naturally inferential, depending on a series of 
internal and mnemonic cues which have some degree of legitimacy in predicting one’s own 
future performance of memory recall, as well as on subjective confidence. The mnemonic 
cues encountered in the literature include the ease of processing the information during 
encoding, familiarity and ease of retrieval (fluency with which information comes to mind) 
(see in Koriat & Ma’ayan, 2005) which all belong to the general dimension termed processing 
fluency. Furthermore, processing fluency can originate different typologies of phenomenal 
experience contingent either with some attributes of the past or particular attributes of the 
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stimulus at present (Kelley & Jacoby, 1996). Unfortunately, though, the dynamics of human 
memory are complex and not intuitive. Accurate beliefs about how memory works are 
tremendously important in a variety of contexts and situations in which people (students, 
consumers and more) come to decision making and almost certainly rely on memory cues to 
support their actions. In a lot of circumstances, in particular within a short retention, people 
do not predict that they will forget over time, thus resulting in “a failure to appreciate the 
degree to which memory can change over time”, referred as stability bias (Kornell & Bjork, 
2009).  
 
The finding that forgetting happens puts in highlight the difference between holding a 
metacognitive belief and applying that belief in practice. Kornell and Bjork (2009) findings 
on the matter suggest that people are usually overconfident in their memories and that they 
make memory predictions based on their situational-current state of their memories. These 
results are a clever sign of a stability bias in human memory as yet every area of psychology 
accredits the assumption that every human behaviour depends partly on the context stimulus 
(Erev et al., 1994). In our investigation there will be a strong interest in participants’ 
predictions of their future memory performance when judgments are made immediately after 
the storage of information. Our attention on JOLs falls into the measurement of both absolute 
and relative accuracy, and so on their measures of the difference between what is and what is 
not remembered. In the attempt to create an environment that is as casual as possible we 
decided not to alter any variable (besides our control variable of retention interval between the 
two phases in our experiments) by asking our participants to rely exclusively on their 
cognitive abilities, and so limiting eventual processing fluency features that would have 
otherwise biased our research.  
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4. Cognitive abilities and prospective memory 
 
 
Our point of departure in attempting to understand the processes that govern and regulate 
people’s cognitive abilities when performing an ongoing task is to put great attention on 
prospective memory and its decline in delayed-execute situations. To the extent that 
prospective memory is in general strongly affected by the environment where the respondent 
is examined (university campus for experiment one and the gym for experiment two) we 
expect that memory decays mostly due to larger time intervals as long as other variables 
present in nature are retained equal among each case. Nevertheless, it is important to be aware 
of other different cues which may alter positively (or negatively) memory performance. As 
described by Koriat and Bjork (2006), there exists a theory based cognitive ability, which 
corresponds to the information that is retrieved from memory, and a mnemonic based 
cognitive ability, which instead corresponds to the experienced based skills that are used 
automatically and unconsciously and that highlight a link between metacognitive skills and 
transfer (performance) in memory tests.  
 
What remains vague from the studies that have so far documented metacognitive 
abilities on memory performance is the impact of very short retention intervals on retrieval of 
prospective memory intentions before their actual execution (in experiment one) and, 
eventually, during their execution (in experiment two). The work reported here examines 
respondents’ intentions for future actions, their JOLs and their recall fluency with a focus on 
drawing the underlying differences between a between-subject study and within-subject one. 
In particular, we are interested in considering factors such as the demand of the ongoing 
activity performed by the respondents on the relationship between working memory and 
prospective memory performance. In fact, for the most part, existing studies were designed 
simply to determine whether working memory resources correlate with prospective memory 
(McDaniel & Einstein, 2007) neglecting the conditions under which the monitoring function 
is and is not assumed to be necessary for successful prospective memory retrieval. In order to 
address the issue we centered our mission on these research questions: 
 
 Do people forget prospective memory intentions after very short time 
intervals? 
 What pattern does the forgetting rate follow over different short time intervals? 
 Are people overconfident about future memory performance? 
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 How does the ongoing activity influence memory performance on respondents’ 
cognitive abilities among different studies? 
 
The importance of these questions’ answers stands in their dual contribution to two 
related disciplines that often are taken for largely diverse: psychology and marketing 
(Babutsidze, 2007). On the first instance, this research will complement the existing literature 
on prospective memory by analyzing the impact of short time intervals on JOLs, retrieval 
skills and its relationship with the working memory performance (as described above). On the 
second case, this paper will be an important tool for consumer behaviour researchers and 
marketers that aim at understanding the processes that underlay quick decision making and 
action of consumers when they start their purchasing journey with a conscious goal. In 
particular, knowing how people reason and what factors drive their instincts towards a 
decision at the exclusion of another is extremely important for advertisers.  Braun-La Tour et 
al. (2004) describe a “paradigm shifting” in the field of consumer behaviour research where 
reconstructive memory processes, exerted by past experiences with a product, company or 
advert, can significantly influence preferences and prospective memory actions in the 
direction of a favorable brand or trademark. Furthermore, marketers will be enabled to predict 
consumers’ action and, thus, to control with higher efficacy all the phases of designing, 
planning and executing an advertising campaigns. The ultimate objective for marketing 
managers would be pinpointing those consumers who do not perform an intention, such as 
forgetting to make a purchase, and reminding them of the missing action by helping them 
remember what they have overlooked.  
 
There are several marketing activities where the understanding of the consumer’s 
memory is the key for a successful managerial initiative and advertising strategy. They all 
hold and relate to the consumer’s consciousness and rationality in his decision of making a 
purchase, which ultimately relies on past experiences, knowledge and intentions derived from 
memory. In the concluding sections of this paper more practical implications on these topics 
will be illustrated. Now, we will give room for presenting the methodologies and designs that 
have characterised this research. 
16 
 
5. Experiment one 
 
 
In our first experiment we examined how well prospective memory intentions are 
remembered by respondents after five different retention intervals. As previously noted, we 
assume that time has a negative impact on memory performance but a positive one in defining 
the absolute and relative accuracy of memory predictions made immediately after formulating 
the intentions. The pattern would be such that the greater the time interval between the 
formation of intention (phase one) and retrieval of that intention from memory (phase two) 
the greater would be the forgetting mode and more precise would be the judgments about 
one’s own memory abilities. 
Several previous studies on planning and encoding intentions identified a bond 
between the complexity of the prospective memory task and the planning behaviour of people 
(Kvavilashvili and Ellis, 1996). Some prospective memory activities may require a set of 
steps to follow, such as buying a present for a friend. To accomplish this, it may be necessary 
to build a plan that comprises all the actions involved in the process of buying the gift, like 
going to the gift shop, picking an item, buying packing material and so forth. Some other 
intentions, second, may raise a complicated decision to undertake such as deciding to assist a 
colleague when you already have a tight schedule to go after. Making this decision will 
engage with the planning of how to complete the other tasks (Marsh, Hicks & Landau, 1998). 
Third but not least, prospective memory tasks “clearly differ in their importance” (McDaniel 
& Einstein, 2007, p. 110) and planning is stimulated in different ways. We took regard of 
these documented results from past research in our study by allowing our respondents to 





In experiment one, we designed a between-subject study in which participants were 
organised in five groups of circa thirty people each. The time interval between the starting 
phase of encoding and the second of retrieval was the only manipulated variable. The study 
was conducted in two university campuses, precisely in Catòlica Lisbon University, Portugal, 
and Lancaster University, UK, where participants were asked to form prospective intentions 
that they would have performed, or thought of performing, in the following week. Following 
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Miller’s (1994) results on his research on people’s capacity limitations of information 
processing, where a maximum of seven pieces of uni-dimensional inputs can be successfully 
remembered over short time intervals, participants had to list a single set of ten intentions of 
future actions in the first phase of our experiment. At this stage, participants were also asked 
to make item-by-item JOLs by saying whether they would remember each individual 
intention mentioned and aggregate JOLs by giving the total number of elements they would 
later recall within the entire batch of intentions stated. Such requisite of the study enabled us 
to verify the relative and absolute accuracy of their predictions. After a predetermined 
retention period of time had passed the respondents had to revoke the intentions earlier 
created without any use of memory aid throughout (see Appendix, p. 41). In order to comply 
with the empirical requirement of data collection and analysis brought up by Simmons et al. 
(2011) in which authors must assemble at least twenty observations per group of scrutiny for 
a powerful sample to detect relevant effects, we gathered information of thirty people per cell 
with the exclusion of the last cell which had only twenty-one participants, due to time 
restrictions. The participants of our study had the freedom to choose what to say and had no 
time constrains during all phases of our experiment, so to induce the planning strategies that 





One-hundred and forty-one English speaking university students of which sixty from 
Catòlica Lisbon University and eighty-one from Lancaster University. The students were 
randomly selected and randomly assigned to one of the five condition groups. They took part 




Stimuli of creating intentions consisted in making the students the question of thinking 
ahead of a week time in order to make them state some of the activities they planned to 
perform. It was vividly clarified to them that the intentions had to be different, unrelated and 
necessary for their upcoming days. It was also asked them to make individual and aggregate 
JOLs for their planned intentions during the first phase of the study. Data was produced 
verbally and no tool was allowed for usage to the respondents to try remember what they were 
18 
 
saying. Only the researcher had a specific device (laptop) to allow him record manually the 




Phase one. Participants who were performing an ongoing activity, such as studying or 
working on campus, were approached by the researcher on a face-to-face interview. After 
having asked them about their willingness to participate and after having told them about the 
purpose of the study, the three steps of the experiment, the retention interval and the ban for 
using any memory aid the examiner started with the experiment. 
 
Phase two. The examiner posed them a single question of listing ten future intentions they 
intended to perform over the following seven days. At this phase, the examiner also required 
them to make, immediately after each intention was mentioned, an item-by-item prediction 
(JOL) to stress whether they would recall or not the intention in the following phase of the 
study. After they listed all ten future tasks and made item-by-item predictions for each, 
participants had to say also how many of the total group of intentions they believed they 
would afterward recall by making an aggregate prediction (a number comprised between zero 
and ten). At the end of this second phase respondents were reminded about the memory aid 
ban which needed to be firmly respected for a meaningful research. 
 
The retention intervals for the five condition groups differed so that Group1 had to go through 
phase two right after phase one (t1 = 0), Group2 had ten minutes (t2 = 10), Group3 had thirty 
minutes (t3 = 30), Group4 had one hour (t4 = 60) and Group5 had one day (t5 = 1 day). The 
experimenter kept a chronometer throughout the experiment and managed to respect exactly 
the stipulated retention intervals of the study. This alteration of the independent variable 
‘time’ in between groups allowed us to carry out and execute a General Linear Model analysis 
on the statistical software SPSS so to conduct and test an Analysis of Variances for the five 
experimental conditions. 
 
During the time intervals, the examiner kept being around without losing sight of the 
participants. But the examiner tried not to be seen so that he did not disturb participants 
during their ongoing tasks. Whenever time and space allowed, the researcher interviewed 
more participants during the  retention intervals, specifically, during the thirty, sixty and one 
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day experimental conditions. Though, he never lost vision of the already interviewed 
respondents by not leaving the place where he started his research. 
 
Phase three. In sequence, after phase two and the time lapse, participants were again 
approached by the researcher, who made the same question as for phase two, that is listing 
again the ten tasks which were mentioned earlier. He collected the prospective intentions that 
could be retrieved from memory by the students. Only in the immediate time interval 
condition participants were immediately asked to restate their tasks after phase two ended. 
Everyone else followed to three phases procedure. 
 
For the ‘one day’ condition of Group5 only, the researcher fixed, in agreement with the 
participants, a meeting location inside the University campus and an exact twenty four hours 







To kick off with the analysis of the collected data three Univariate General Linear 
Model (GLM) studies were indispensable to verify the hypothesis that a significant effect of 
the independent variable time existed on memory performance, total aggregate predictions of 
memory performance and the aggregated item-by-item predictions of our participants. The 
Univariate GLM combines the analyses of ANOVAs and regression-based models and can 
thus handle categorical variables with many levels. These three analyses therefore will test 
whether there is any difference between the groups with diverse time intervals (immediate vs. 
10min. vs. 30min. vs. 60min. vs. 1 day), on memory performance and on memory predictions. 
Memory predictions referred to the total number of items participants predicted they would 
remember. When participants answered they would remember an item, the response was 
coded as 1. In order to execute a first comparison between the respondents’ memory 
predictions and their actual performance we computed the total memory predictions as the 
sum of the ten item-by-item memory predictions. Memory performance was the total number 
of items participants actually remembered after the time interval. 
 
                                                          
1
 The researcher almost exactly respected the ‘one day’ condition with every participant as the latest delay he 
experienced with one of the twenty-one respondents of Group5 reached approximately ten minutes after the 
twenty-four hours gap. 
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In the first test, the GLM disclosed that retention intervals have a significant impact on 
memory performance (F(4, 136) = 4.61, p < .01, see appendices Table3). In figure 1, we can 
observe a decrease in the number of tasks remembered from the immediate time interval until 
the one hour interval, and a small increase after one day. In the second test, referred to the 
total aggregate predictions of memory performance, the same analysis produced a marginally 
significant effect of time on the dependent variable (F(4, 136) = 2.19, p = .07, Table5).  In the 
third test, relative to the aggregated item-by-item predictions, the model yielded a significant 
result (F(4, 136) = 3.78, p < .01, Table7). We can observe in Figure2 below that time 
generated more confidence to our participants about their own memory knowledge. 
 
Next, the data was analyzed using a repeated-measures ANOVA in which memory 
(predictions vs. performance) was entered as a within-subjects factor and time-interval 
(immediate, 10 minutes, 30 minutes, 60 minutes and 1 day) was entered as a between-subjects 
factor. The dependent variables were memory predictions and performance. We first 
compared memory performance with the item-by-item memory predictions. We observed an 
interaction between memory and time-interval (F(4, 136) = 9.79, p < .01, see Figure2 below) 
meaning that the effects of condition on memory predictions and performance were not the 
same. 
 
Subsequently, in order to continue probing into our primary data, we examined the 
specific differences between the five time conditions to verify whether those same differences 
may result significant and relevant to our purposes. 
 
We observed for memory performance that those in the immediate time interval 
condition remembered a similar amount of items (M = 8.90, SD = 1.15) than those in the 10 
minutes of interval condition (M = 8.66, SD = 1.27, F(1, 136) = 0.50, p = .48). However, 
those in the immediate interval condition remembered more items than those in the 30 
minutes condition (M = 8.23, SD = 0.97, F(1, 136) = 4.06, p = .046). There was still a 
marginally significant decay of memory from 30 minutes to 60 minutes of time interval (M = 
7.66, SD = 1.40, F(1, 136) = 2.93, p = .09), but not from 60 minutes to 1 day of interval (M = 
7.90, SD = 1.64, F(1, 136) = 0.43, p = .51).  
 
For item-by-item predictions, separate contrasts reveal that participants predicted they 
would remember fewer items in the immediate time interval condition (M = 7.43, SD = 1.77) 
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than in the 10 minutes condition (M = 8.50, SD = 1.45, F (1, 136) = 6.70, p = .01). However, 
those in the 10 minutes condition, predicted they would remember a similar amount of items 
than those in the 30 minutes condition (M = 8.20, SD = 1.58), in the 60 minutes condition (M 
= 8.73, SD = 1.66) and in the 1 day condition (M = 8.95, SD = 1.43).  
 
We observed no effect of age (ps = .46) nor interaction with one of our factors (ps = 
.54). We also observed no effect of gender (ps = .28) nor interaction with one of our factors 
(ps > .50). 
 
Next, we performed the same analyses using the aggregate measure of memory 
predictions. That is, the number of items participants predicted they would remember. We 
again observed an interaction between memory and time-interval (F(4, 136) = 9.29, p < .01) 
meaning that the effects of condition on memory predictions and performance were not the 
same.  However, for the aggregate memory predictions, we find no significant effect of 
condition (F(4, 136) = 2.19, p = .07), meaning that memory predictions for each time interval 
condition were more or less the same. 
 
 
Note: The error bars around the points represent the standard error by the formula Standard error = 
Standard deviation / Square root of the number of participants in the condition. The standard error is a 
measure of the dispersion of the data around the points. 
 


































Discussion of research findings 
 
Experiment one produced results that were generally consistent with our forecasts. 
However, the absolute values of the total aggregate predictions did not yield a noteworthy 
significance across the five examined levels of time gap, showing that participants did not 
notably modify their memory strategies when thinking ahead of time. We see, thus, the 
occurrence of the foresight bias as predictions about one’s success in retrieving the right 
answers (intention) are made when those answers are readily available (Koriat & Bjork, 
2005). Instead, the finding that short time intervals exerts a meaningful effect on memory 
performance and on aggregate item-by-item predictions is in accordance with the idea that 
even a few tens of minutes, as measured by the scientific experiments that have been 
developed to explore prospective memory (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007), are perceived as 
sufficient to initiate a decay on recall and an overconfidence in people’s cognitive abilities.  
 
Even though our pattern of prospective memory performance brings to light similar 
conclusions to those that have so far portrayed what the literature on short prospective 
memory has documented, we cannot disregard the interesting increase of memory 
performance from the sixty-minute condition to the one day condition. Reasons that may 
explicate such phenomenon could lie on the fact that prospective memory does not display the 
classic negatively forgetting curve that is prominent in the literature of retrospective memory 
(McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). During an event-based prospective memory study conducted by 
Hicks, Marsh, and Russel (2000) memory performance revealed a considerable increase from 
a short retention condition (2.5 minutes) to a longer retention condition (15 minutes), 
although they predicted a constant memory decline across the time intervals. Yet, an older 
experiment from Wilkins (1979) found no disparities in prospective remembering from a two 
to thirty-six days retention conditions. One possibility to interpret these findings is that during 
the course of the time lapse more spontaneous and unconscious retrievals of the intention, in 
the moments prior their execution, may happen as the time intervals increase. Later in 
experiment two we tried to overcome this event by introducing a more challenging distracter 
activity which aimed at reducing the occurrence of these unwitting self-remindings 
(Kvavilashvili, 1987). 
 
In discussing the results of the aggregate predictions we believed that performance 
would have been better foreseen with a longer delay between establishing the prospective 
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tasks and the commencing of the cover intentions. As predicted, the total aggregate JOLs 
made by our participants improved with the increase of the retention intervals (as we see that 
they move near the performance line in Figure2 above), suggesting that people are more 
aware of how many of the intended actions are likely to forget in the near future when the 
retention gap raises. As Koriat and Bjork (2006) discovered in their studies on the 
metacognitive abilities of people’s judgments “improved metacognition is one key to 
optimising transfer” (p. 1133), that is the adjustment of one’s own memory functions to real 
world situations thank to the awareness of the retention period. Instead, although the 
metacognitive abilities of our respondents seemed showing an adaptation to time lapses, the 
aggregate item-by-item predictions pointed towards patterns of overconfidence when 
intentions are taken separately from one another. In our specific case, respondents were not 
able to successfully predict whether they would have remembered prospective intentions if 
processed individually, implying that they were less aware of which intended actions were 
more likely to forget. One of the causes that may explain this observed fact is based on the 
time being considered as a ‘distance metaphor’ where judgments about the upcoming future 
are intrinsically a function of a person’s intertemporal preferences. In particular, when a 
temporal judgment is associated with a judgment of future time, “spacial distance will 
influence how long or short individuals judge a future time to be” (Kim, Zauberman & 
Bettman, 2012, p. 868). This phenomenon, denominated forward telescoping, could have 
contributed in misleading our participants’ item-by-item predictions by making them believe 
that the intentions they mentioned could be remembered easier whether they planned to 
perform those intentions very soon in time (Prohaska, Brown & Belli, 1998). However, this 
increasing pattern concerning individual prospective memory predictions does not necessarily 
translate into people’s misconduct when facing daily tasks; it merely shows the psychological 
reality of people’s overconfidence about their own cognitive skills. 
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6. Experiment two 
 
 
Participants’ memory abilities in experiment one were very strong throughout the five 
condition groups, following a slow decrease over the retention times tested. We did not expect 
significant memory decays in each experimental condition, but we became concerned that 
perhaps respondents had discounted the effect of time on their memory performances because 
of not having yet initiated the process of executing any of the intentions said. More 
specifically, although our students were deeply engrossed in their ongoing activities, these last 
ones were not very demanding in terms of resources needed for strategic monitoring of the 
prospective memory intentions (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). Kvavilashvili (1987) offered 
evidence that ongoing activities that are more engaging lead to lessen people’s thoughts 
concerning the prospective tasks, so to partially blur the phonological loop and sketchpad of 
the working memory model that are responsible for the monitoring function of memory. In 
experiment one we did find an effect of time on prospective memory performance, but since 
participants could not perform the tasks they listed right away we wanted to test whether the 
effect of time would hold when respondents are focused in the examined tasks. 
By testing a second sample of participants involved in a much more interesting 
ongoing activity we sought to decrease the chances of spontaneous retrieval normally 
triggered by the presence, and not immediacy, of the prospective memory target (McDaniel & 
Einstein, 2007). Marsh et al. (1998) demonstrated that by increasing the cognitive burden of 
the ongoing task, by adding a primary task (that is, executing an exercise), sometimes 
hampers the prospective memory performance. The interpretation of their results, thus, 
explains a takeover of the working memory resources on the prospective memory activity in 
favor of the ongoing task, yielding an increase in the central executive demands and a lowered 
prospective memory performance. 
Another key difference between experiment two and experiment one looked at testing 
every participant of the second study to every variation that our experimental variable 
followed, so that we had a within-subject study instead of another between-subject design, 
that already characterised our study one, where respondents are assigned to groups of 







In experiment two we tried to measure, as for experiment one, the impact of time on 
prospective memory performance. Though, differently from before, participants were 
instructed by the researcher about the prospective tasks that to had to be borne in mind (and 
possibly execute) during a compelling ongoing activity, which required both body movements 
and strong cognitive attention (that is, a basketball training session). The design followed a 
within-subject study where participants were organised in three groups of five and where the 
experimental condition ‘time’ was manipulated equally for everyone. All participants within 
the same group were given, in the first phase of the experiment, the same and all pieces of 
information, which were clustered in categories on the basis of their nature and difficulty. The 
groups only differed in the order of the tasks given, for example Group1 received as first 
relatively easy information which explained the execution of a set of tasks, then a medium 
difficulty information set for the execution of another set of tasks, and finally a high difficulty 
information set for a third set of tasks. Group2 received first the medium set, followed by the 
high and easy sets; Group3 received first the high set, followed by the easy and medium sets 
(see Figure3 below for the information sets and Figure4 for their order in each group). During 
the first phase of the study participants were only asked to listen to the instructions and then 
to make three aggregate predictions (JOLs) for each set of instructions and one aggregate 
prediction for the total set of information. Subsequently, all groups were asked on three 
separate steps of the experiment to interrupt their ongoing activity to verbally recall the tasks 
they were initially presented; precisely, immediately after phase one (t1 = 0), after ten minutes 
(t2 = 10) and after thirty minutes (t3 = 30). The order of the information asked at each stage 
followed rigorously the order of the allocation of the instructions given at the beginning. This 
experiment, given its design and complexity, was conducted in three different training 




Fifteen students of Lancaster University men’s and women’s basketball teams that 
played at the Sports Centre facility in the campus during three post-season sessions; 
specifically, ten boys and five girls. The players were randomly approached and selected in 
one of the sessions from a total group of circa twenty each time and were also randomly 
assigned to one of the three orders of information sets. As for experiment one, participants 
took part to the experiment without any incentive or reward for their participation. The 
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basketball players in each session, taken as a whole, were known by the experimenter as he 




Information provision by the researcher was only on verbal form. The instructions 
accounted for a total of twelve pieces of data distributed in three clusters of four on the basis 
of their nature and difficulty (Figure3). In particular, instructions were designed to be 
fundamentals of the game of basketball that referred to the use of ‘hands’ on the ball (the easy 
set), the use of ‘feet’ on the floor (the medium set) and the use of ‘body’ on the court (the 
high difficulty set)
2
. Respondents were asked not to, for the entire duration of the experiment, 
take note, rehearse or talk about the information received. At the point of the recalling tests 
participants were distributed a piece of paper and a pen for the data collection. Microsoft 
Excel was again the initial tool at disposal of the researcher to fill in the data that was 
collected through the use of pieces of papers during the experiment. 
The twelve pieces of information for the field experiment follow: 
 
 
How to use the HANDS  
on the ball (EASY) 
How to move the FEET 
on the floor (MEDIUM) 
How to position the BODY 
on the court (DIFFICULT) 
 
 The thumbs should form a 
T shape when holding the 
ball 
 
 The middle finger of the 
shooting hand should be 
positioned on one of the 
cavities of the ball 
 
 The hand palms never 
touch the ball 
 
 The fingers of the shooting 




 The body weight should be 
entirely on the toes (heels 
up) with the knees are bent 
 
 The toe of the changing-
direction foot must point 
towards the new way 
 
 To perform a cross over 
move the second step must 
be very small 
 
 The attacking foot from a 
‘stop and go’ situation 
always goes forward 
 
 When playing man-to-man 
defense the chest must be in 
front of the opponent’s 
 The weak side defense is 
positioned along the 
imaginary line of the two 
baskets and one meter below 
the passing line  
 When catching the outlet the 
body should be next to the 
sideline on the projection of 
the free-throw line 
 A ‘cut to the basket’ must 
end under the hoop, below 
the low-post position 
 
(Figure3). 
                                                          
2 The information sets’ difficulty levels have been defined by the experimenter. At the time of the experiment, he 
held 17 years of (inter)national experience on the game of basketball, both as a player and as a coach. He 
benchmarked the level of difficulty of the information sets with a close colleague of his, who also had circa 20 
years of basketball experience. 
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Order of the information sets that each group received and performed, (the allocation of the 
orders was random to the experimental groups): 
 
Group one: order of 
information sets’ learned and 
retrieved 
Group two: order of 
information sets’ learned 
and retrieved 
Group three: order of 
information sets’ learned 
and retrieved 
 
1. Hands – (performed at  
t = 0) 
2. Feet – (t = 10 min) 
3. Body – (t = 30 min) 
 
1. Feet – (t = 0) 
2. Body – (t = 10 min) 
3. Hands – (t = 30 min) 
 
1. Body – (t = 0) 
2. Hands – (t = 10 min) 






Phase one. Five players of twenty who showed up for a post-season basketball session were 
randomly approached by the researcher to volunteer for the experiment before the session 
started, which took place at the gym. Given their acceptance, participants were instructed to 
form one team, about the study’s procedure and its steps (see Appendix for the structure of 
the interactions, p. 47). 
 
Meanwhile the researcher had picked and talked to the experimental group, the remaining 
players, those who did not participate to the study, were told to form other teams by 
themselves and start playing games against each other. 
 
Phase two. As second step, participants to the study were verbally taught by the examiner 
about all three information sets, thus receiving the entire group of instructions at one of the 
orders previously described in a random way. They also were told about the instructions’ 
informative nature, but not about the different levels of difficulty.  
 
Phase three. All individuals within the group were asked orally (see the text below for the 
actual conversation and questions), immediately after phase two, to make a total of four 
memory predictions: three aggregate predictions for each set of information and one 
aggregate prediction for the total package of tasks received. They were handed a piece of 
blank paper and a pen each by the examiner to make predictions. Each player had to write his 
name on the paper. During this phase each group of players, right after predictions were 
made, had to list also the first set of instructions they had been given (that is, either the four 
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pieces of information about ‘hands’, ‘feet’ or ‘body’). Memory performance was tested on a 
different paper from the predictions’ one. The immediate test condition was already being 
executed. Participants had to report the information in an open ended space on the paper 
provided to them for data collection. This is how the situation was handled by the 
experimenter: 
 
<Please, take now one piece of paper and pen. Write down your names and 
four numbers that should represent how many tasks that I gave you, you 
think you will recall. The first three refer to each set of information you 
received. Please, write your predictions in order with the order of the  
information sets you received. They should be three numbers comprised 
between zero to four. The fourth and last number should represent your total 
memory prediction. A number between zero and twelve. Once you have 
finished please give me back pens and papers. Take now another piece of 
paper and please list the tasks of the first set you received. Please, always put 
your name on it. Once you have finished please give me back pens and 




The players were asked to play one (or more) game of basketball as ongoing activity against 
the other teams, which were external to our research. Participants had freedom to perform the 
instructed tasks (or not) during the game.  
 
Phase four. After ten minutes the experimental groups had to stop the ongoing activity, under 
indication of the experimenter, and report on another paper, always handed by the 
experimenter, what they could remember about the second set of prospective instructions 
given by the researcher. Pens were also distributed by the experimenter. This is how the 
experimenter approached again each group: 
 
<Ok guys, please stop playing. Pick up a piece of paper and a pen, write 
your name and please list the tasks of the second set you received. Once you 
have finished please give me back pens and papers and go playing. I will 
stop you when other twenty minutes will be passed. Thank you>. 
 
Phase five. After thirty minutes the experimental groups had to stop again the ongoing 
activity and report on a third piece of paper the third set of prospective tasks given at the 




<Ok guys, please stop playing. Pick up a piece of paper and a pen, write 
your name and please list the tasks of the third set you received. Once you 
have finished please give me back pens and papers and go playing. The 
experiment is finished. Please do not yet talk about anything about the 




We analyzed the data using a repeated-measures ANOVA in which memory 
(predictions vs. performance) was entered as a within-subjects factor, the time-interval 
(immediate, 10 minutes, 30 minutes) was also entered as a within-subjects factor and the 
counterbalancing of order of instructions (hands, foot, body) as a between-subjects factor.  
 
We observed an interaction between memory and time-interval (F(1, 12) = 7.27, p = 
.02, Table8) meaning that the effects of time intervals on memory predictions and 
performance were not the same. In order to understand this interaction, we examined the 




We found a significant effect of time interval on memory performance (F(1, 12) = 
12.12, p < .01, Table10), but not on memory predictions (F(1, 12) = 0.42, p = .53, Table9). 
The effect of time interval on memory performance was marginally qualified by an interaction 
with the counterbalancing condition of what instruction came first (F(1, 12) = 3.56, p = .06, 
Table10) suggesting that the memory decay was stronger for some types of instructions. As 
one can see in table 1, there is a decay in memory performance from the immediate time 
interval condition to the 30 minutes time interval condition. This effect is not observed in 
memory predictions. Only for the information set relative to ‘hands’ there is no decay in 






N Memory predictions Memory performance 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
hands immediate 4 2.49 0.33 1.75 0.96 
hands 10 min 5 2.53 1.12 2.20 1.30 
                                                          
3
 When reporting on the distributed pieces of paper the memory predictions that were initially asked, a total of 
five participants failed in writing their aggregate predictions for the individual information sets, possibly due to 
the presence of distractions in the gym or negligence. In order to cope with this issue and continue with the 
analysis of the data, their prediction values have been substituted with the average prediction of their group for 







N Memory predictions Memory performance 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
hands 30 min 6 2.44 0.50 2.17 1.33 
feet immediate 6 2.83 0.75 2.50 0.84 
feet 10 min 4 2.74 0.18 1.50 1.29 
feet 30 min 5 2.53 1.12 1.60 0.89 
body immediate 5 2.73 1.30 3.40 0.89 
body 10 min 6 2.78 0.75 2.33 1.21 
body 30 min 4 2.74 0.18 1.25 0.50 
 
(Table12 – SPSS). 
 
Next, we added the years of experience (M = 5.46, SD = 2.48) as a continuous 
predictor in the analyses. We observed that years of experience qualified the interaction 
between memory and time interval (F(1, 12) = 6.84, p = .02, Table11). A median split in the 
years of experience was performed (median = 5.5) and respondents were classified as having 
high or low years of experience. As we can observe in the table below the decay of memory 










Low 2,4214 ,91509 7 
High 2,9500 ,82714 7 
Total 2,6857 ,88174 14 
Predictions 
10 min 
Low 2,4214 ,70996 7 
High 2,9000 ,83417 7 
Total 2,6607 ,78451 14 
Predictions  
30 min 
Low 2,4214 ,70996 7 
High 2,7571 ,68704 7 
Total 2,5893 ,69342 14 
Memory  
no interval 
Low 2,429 ,9759 7 
High 2,714 1,2536 7 
Total 2,571 1,0894 14 
Memory 10 min Low 2,000 1,1547 7 
High 2,000 1,4142 7 
Total 2,000 1,2403 14 
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Memory 30 min Low 1,143 ,3780 7 
High 2,000 1,0000 7 
Total 1,571 ,8516 14 
 
(Table13 – SPSS). 
 
Discussion of research findings 
 
The overall logic of experiment two was the same as for experiment one, where our 
objective was again to measure the impact of retention intervals on memory performance and 
memory predictions. The results originated from the analysis of the data almost exactly 
mirrored what the research had already found, that there is a significant impact of short time 
intervals on prospective memory performance of our participants, but no significant change 
appeared in their judgments of learning. In fact, across the three different retention gaps that 
have been examined, memory predictions showed very small (or no) adjustments over time. 
As for experiment one, this phenomenon should be explained by the foresight bias since our 
respondents were asked to make the aggregate predictions for the three information sets and 
the entire group of instructions right after having received all information from the examiner 
at the beginning of the experiment. Thus, the answers to their memory tests, which were later 
performed, were readily available at the immediate condition.  
 
To summarise, the results on memory performance illustrated a decay independently 
of the difficulty of the ongoing activity that participants had to carry out. According to 
McDaniel and Einstein (2000) though, in their studies about the existence of a multiprocess 
theory  of prospective memory on humans where the effectiveness of spontaneous retrieval 
processes rely on the diverse situations in which people stand and, therefore, yield an 
adjustment of people’s memory strategies in different contexts, the nature and demands of the 
ongoing task affect the degree of processing the prospective memory intentions. In our case, 
the challenging ongoing task of playing basketball very likely brought the players into 
engaging with different strategies that would have allowed them to improve their memory 
performance (i.e. employing visual coding strategies to process the information received on 
the game of basketball, so to give it a meaning when playing), although memory retrieval 
ended in following a strong negative rate for those information sets designed to be of medium 
(use of feet) and of high (use of body) difficulty levels. Instead, if we look to the prospective 
task results relative to the low level of difficulty (use of hands), memory performance did not 
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decrease over time, meaning that the nature of the information does have a consequence on 
encoding and retrieval fluency of people. We do observe a marginally significant interaction 
with the type of the instruction (p = .06) suggesting that people forget over time medium 
(feet) and difficult material (body), but not easy material (hands). In conceptualising this 
effect, we may find ourselves agreeing with Winkielman and Cacioppo (2001) who 
discovered that evaluations of sets of information (for example, an object) are “adversely 
affected by the difficulty with which judgment-relevant information about the object can be 
processed” (p. 248; see also Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazandeiro & Reber, 2003). Therefore, 
the easier the data to handle, the more probable is that that data is integrated and remembered. 
 
The ability to recall places, things and people encountered in the course of daily life is 
fundamental to learn from experience. Without memory, anybody would be lost and would 
operate aimlessly. Thus, persistence of acquired information is vital to a numerous of 
situations (Smith & Kosslyn, 2009). When we considered our respondents’ years of basketball 
experience to make a comparison between players’ memory performance with many years of 
practice (> 5.5 years) and players’ memory performance with less experience (< 5.5 years), 
we discovered that those players who were more familiar with the game of basketball had a 
slower decreasing rate of forgetting about the instructions given by the experimenter. This 
situation may be explained by the unsurprising contribution to memory performance of long 
term memory, which causes remembrance of past events to guide the present through thought 
and action (Smith & Kosslyn, 2009). As a result, we should conclude that people with a 
relatively strong background on a specific area or subject remember new information about 
that area in an easier manner than people without strong experience. Another theory that may 
help us understand this phenomenon lies in the definition of episodic memory, which supports 
memory for definite life events (Tulving, 1993); in our case, we refer it to anything related to 
basketball retrieved from past and long term memory, like previous trainings and games, that 
our participants might have experienced before the conduction of the study.  
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7. Experiments’ limitations 
 
 
Although our experiments contributed in answering our research questions we must be 
aware of the shortcomings of our trials. Considering the idea that prospective memory 
predictions and performance strongly depend on the environment and situation in which 
people is found, we are obliged to recognise that, for the purposes of analyzing only the effect 
of one independent variable (time), selecting participants who were closely related in terms of 
naturalistic settings (university study halls in experiment one; basketball gym in experiment 
two) might have influenced our research. Likely, by doing so, we simply have meaningful 
results when we find ourselves describing similar scenarios. Furthermore, in our first 
experiment, the selected context of investigation, chosen mainly because of time and money 
restrictions, yielded a population sample of respondents composed of entirely students, with 
an average young age comprised between eighteen and thirty-five (see Table0a and 0b). This 
bounder might have influenced the highly positive prospective memory performance in our 
analysis as university students are more educated in finding roadways to carry new 
information within their brain regions of memory storage (Willis, 2006). 
 
The desire to create a real-world prospective memory phenomena is often at odds with 
the willingness to grasp the full richness of a natural event (Banaji & Crowder, 1989). In the 
first study, we tried to extract people’s ideas for their future actions by making them a 
question that forced them to think about activities that they would have undertaken. Doing so, 
inevitably, we transformed an unconscious cognitive action of planning into a conscious and 
rational one. In addition, when making plans and schedules thinking of the near future, people 
enhance their abilities of retrieval fluency due to subtle and automatic associative memories 
between the internally generated events and their past experiences (Moscovitch, 1994).  
 
Making retention intervals salient makes people more sensitive to time horizon 
(Zauberman et al., 2009), and the execution of the prospective intention during those intervals 
yields a high activation state for those intentions that have been executed. On the subject, 
Goschke and Kuhl (1993) say that retrieval latencies from memory are consistently faster for 
actions that had been performed (intention superiority effect). In our case, during the second 
phase of experiment two, respondents were instructed about all the three information sets and 
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about the retention intervals in which they had to be examined. In between phases participants 
had to play one or several games of basketball in which they had freedom to perform the 
taught prospective tasks. Our research results might have been influenced by this 
phenomenon because, whether players performed the instructed activities during one of the 
retention gaps, they could have more easily remembered to report the tasks that were objects 
of our research. This circumstance might have resulted into a higher memory performance 
that would have not happened if players did not execute the prospective activities. Even 
though we believe this phenomena might have taken place, memory performance in 
experiment two did not follow flat forgetting rates, but still it decreased over time. 
 
Another relevant observation, that intentions of future tasks happen uncontrolled and 
very quickly in people’s minds, seemed to have limited our research when we required our 
respondents to interrupt, in two (or more) separate occasions, their ongoing activities to 
encode and recall the prospective intentions. Yet, the examiner’s presence and intervention 
might have triggered monitoring and strategic memory functions which would not be as 
obvious and noticeable as in a natural and research-free environment (Guynn et al., 2005; 
Jacoby & Hollingshead, 1990). All of these factors, as the previous ones, could have induced 
to higher response rates and better memory performance of our participants. 
 
7.a Directions for future research 
 
In studying several prospective memory phenomena, many researchers have tended to 
centre their focus on those issues connected with the amount and quality of information that 
could be retrieved after an encoding or a creative phase. Our work explicitly focused on the 
effects of time on memory performance and memory predictions. In our domain, it was 
relevant to understand how retention intervals influence people’s metacognitive abilities. A 
further step on the subject, that the literature on prospective memory is still missing, would 
look upon experimental designs and applications that permit psychologists and memory 
scholars to pinpoint the thin threshold lying in between the initial decay of prospective 
memory performance and the latter improvement in memory retrieval fluency (as we have 
encountered in between the sixty-minute condition and the one-day condition of experiment 
one). The accumulation of such knowledge to the existing literature would complement the 
research that looks towards explaining the mental processes and memory nodes which 
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organise the storage of information and the reporting functions in human brain. 
Understanding how people make plans and identifying the factors that activate their mental 
memory strategies would then facilitate the experts’ explanation of people’s behaviour when 
they are found in different situations. 
 
Another topic that could be further explored in future researches refers to the 
relationship between prospective memory and the intention superiority effect brought up by 
Goschke and Kulh (1993). In particular, it would be interesting to know whether the 
heightened activation from memory of a specific action, thus for those future intentions that 
have been performed at least once already in the past, has a functional impact on prospective 
memory retrieval when the moment of their execution comes. The answer to this question 
would add on the rationale that guides psychologists when describing remembering patterns 
of people; it would also allow consumer behaviour investigators to formulate more precise 
definitions of their companies’ consumer segments and targets when looking at how people 
act (or react) in specific situations. An example of the latter would be such that if a software 
development company finds itself selling a program to a new client it may expect that he 
knows how to use the purchased system. Whether this is not true by seeing, for instance, what 
type of questions the client makes about the program or what concerns he has, the software 
manufacturer may provide more specific customer service schemes that include some extra 
services for him. In sum, in the real world, knowing about prospective memory and customer 
behaviours could be very important to increase consumer loyalty, brand image and brand 







8.a General discussion 
 
According to our analysis conducted through the execution of two experiments, with the first 
one being a between-subject experiment and the second a within-subject experiment, 
prospective memory performance and predictions of the interviewed students appeared to be 
dissociated from each other. Taken as a whole, the results of our research yielded that 
people’s memories about future intentions come across a significant reduction of performance 
when the retention intervals between an initial phase of generating tasks (or storage) and a 
second one of retrieval are less than 1 hour long. As we have observed, this phenomenon is 
true when the experimental condition time is embedded between the zero retention minute 
and the one hour condition (experiment one and two). On the other hand, when the time gap 
in between phases widened up from the sixty minutes condition, the rate of forgetting 
decreased. Thus, our results fit with the pattern of prospective memory that was previously 
identified and studied by Hicks et al. (2000) in their research about the attributes of retention 
intervals on retaining prospective memories. In addition, in line with Wyer et al. (2008), on 
people’s ability to process information and to develop future intentions in memory, the nature 
and difficulty of the information present in the environment have diverse and heterogeneous 
effects on people’s prospective memory performance. Indeed, the different information sets 
which were presented to our respondents in experiment two,  resulted following the negative 
arc pattern of memory performance whether the information sets were of medium or of high 
difficulty to encode. Memory performance did not decrease over short periods of time when 
the prospective tasks were reasonably easy to remember. 
 
When we shift the centre of the discussion away from people’s memory performance, 
but towards their abilities to make item-by-item predictions about their memories and 
cognitive abilities we cannot land on the same concluding ground that paved the previous one. 
In fact, despite people’s extensive experience throughout their lives with prospective memory 
tasks and its types of triggers and forecasts, they tend to overestimate their memory skills 
when discounting the effect of time on their singular intentions. The similar findings 
stemming from both experiment one and experiment two on our participants’ abilities to 
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predict their future memory, indicate the existence of a forecasting error which “results from 
people’s tendency to anchor on their current state” (Meyvis, Levav & Ratner, 2010, p. 579) 
when planning to recall their future actions. In accordance with such view, the dynamics of 
humans’ learning and memory investigated by Koriat et al. (2004) suggested the presence of a 
stability bias, that is people’s propensity to assume that memory will continue to linger stable 
over time rather than taking advantage from past experiences. The attractive finding that 
people wrongly predict what intentions they will remember blossomed mainly from 
experiment one. The general picture from previous research is that, by and large, people can 
accurately monitor their memories for short periods of time (Miele, Finn, & Molden, 2011; 
and Rhodes & Tauber, 2011) and that generating ideas and intentions are less demanding in 
terms of energies and resources when thinking ahead in future remembering (Begg et al., 
1991). But, while our participants seemed following an adjusting pattern over time on their 
overall aggregate predictions of intentions, and so getting closer in being correct with their 
performance, they did not actually predict better the individual items they thought of 
recalling. This result suggests us that internally generated intentions (as in experiment one), 
instead of being externally induced (as in experiment two), did not necessarily transmute in an 
adaptation of memory strategies to different situations. Whereas people are more precise 
about their total memory capacity, they are overconfident about which intentions they will 
remember in the future. 
 
 
8.b Capitalising on managerial contributions and practical 
implications 
 
As the area of prospective memory has achieved greater attention in the cognition and 
memory literature, academics and professionals in the correlated fields of marketing and 
consumer behaviour have augmented their interest and consideration to prospective memory. 
In the bigger picture, prospective memory research may offer leverage on the more universal 
issue of comprehending human decision making and planning which, if taken in concert, 
facilitate the analysis and interpretation of consumer’s enactment. On the subject, Gollwitzer 
and Sheeran (2009) reached the conclusion that people’s decision making and realization 
strategies are intensely maneuvered by in situ information and encounters, meaning that 
consumers actively react to the situational context in which their actions are initiated. But 
closer to our goals and research objectives about prospective memory’s applications to 
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marketing, the same authors stress how goal-intentions, described as people’s desired end 
states, are formed for the purpose of achieving one’s goal in which a future goal-relevant 
situational cue is essential for the intentions’ formation and spontaneous recall. For example, 
a person who has the goal to start eating healthier can form the goal-intention that, if he sees a 
healthy product on the store shelf when normally going grocery shopping, he will 
spontaneously retrieve from memory his initial intention and he will buy the healthier option. 
Other researches instead focused on the nature of the information cues and their intrinsic 
characteristics of being general versus detailed or easy versus complex (Wyer et al., 2008; and 
Kramer & Yoon, 2007). When dealing with the triggers that influence people’s decision 
making and planning, Wyer et al. (2008) concluded that easier and informative types of 
messages have a stronger effect on consumers’ decisions development and progression. One 
of the consequences of being unaware that memory decays and forgetting happens over time 
brings people to not only misjudge their memory abilities, but also to avoid adequately plan 
ahead. 
 
Whether we consider prospective memory and its components in one way or in the 
other, forming goal-oriented intentions and their related triggering cues help people coping 
with issues related to goal striving, like getting started, remaining on track and executing an 
action. From a marketer’s point of view this matter should concern him in finding a way that 
pinpoints those consumers who show a forgetting pattern or may do so. The marketer’s 
objective in finding those consumers is to consent himself a prompt intervention and help 
people in making decisions, in retrieving from memory and in triggering an action, when they 
behave as shoppers in an offline or online context. This is the main reason why we find 
managerial contributions of our research for marketing management. Specifically, we believe 
that the marketing areas which hold a stronger link to prospective memory of consumers are: 
a) behavioural targeting, which refers to technologies and practices aimed at enhancing the 
effectiveness of advertising online (James, 2006); and b) shopper marketing, which instead 
looks upon the understanding of how one’s own target consumers behave as shoppers 









In the past decade traditional online marketing came back to fashion after having been 
underrated by several industries (Perkett, 2010). In particular, one of the reasons why online 
advertising has not been very effective is that pop-ups and banner ads were seen from 
consumers as too unspecific and generalised to their personal needs (James, 2006). 
Behavioural targeting and customisation of online advertising add an extra dimension to the 
digital marketing field, especially for those consumers who spend in between a few minutes 
to more than one hour on internet for shopping. Hauser et al. (2009) showed on his paper 
about website morphing that companies would achieve overall better results if firms’ websites 
and ads would morph to fit the consumers’ cognitive styles, compromising between the 
analytical and intuitive displays. Since it is highly probable that people do not remember 
everything once they start to navigate on the net, customised pop-up ads could be the solution 
in helping those customers who forget to complete a specific purchase or simply do not find a 
specific item on a determined website (Haubl and Trifts, 2000). For example, when a 
consumer purchases groceries online from a major retailer for the upcoming week, sometimes 
the process may take more than one hour. It is then the pop-up ad that displays the forgotten 
item to the customer the moment he checks out for payment. Today, given the technologies 
and techniques at disposal of large companies, powerful database marketing methodologies 
and algorithms are possible for implementation (James, 2006). In fact, by providing 
customers with online loyalty schemes it is possible to collect specific information about that 
unique customers when they return to the company’s website. Such collection of data about 
the customer would allow the sellers to pinpoint the items the customer usually purchases and 




A focus on those marketing activities that aim at influencing a shopper along and 
beyond the entire path to a purchase fall within the shopper marketing field (Shankar, 2011). 
Over the past few years, retailers increased their resources to this practice of studying and 
nudging their consumers when they are in shopping mode (Deloitte Research, 2007). A deep 
understanding of shopper behaviour and marketing stimuli, designed not only to build brand 
equity and attract customers but also for leading them to make a purchase, are indispensable 
for an effective marketing strategy and promotional campaigns. Thus, it should become 
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apparent to marketers that consumers’ actions are driven by both their own intentions and the 
environment in which they are found. For the purposes of this paper, we will now consider 
people behaving as shoppers when buying offline, that is at the store, when they spend at least 
ten minutes inside the shop.  
Today, many retail environments have transformed in experiential and magical 
settings, becoming places where more than just buying groceries and casual items; because of 
this, shoppers actually forget that they are shopping as they are at the store to do also other 
things (Flint, 2011). If the retail store had to implement its customer’s knowledge and 
database to the development of innovative systems that would prevent or identify patterns of 
consumers forgetting, it would be enabled to successfully intervene and help its customers by 
reminding them of what they planned to purchase or did not buy. One possible idea, derived 
by our prospective memory knowledge that people forget within short periods of time, would 
be of providing consumers with memory aids that could be sent to their email addresses or 
handed at the store. Another solution would look at reminding the customers of what items 
they usually bought in the past when paying at the cashier, whether they did not pick those 
typical items in their karts. 
 
As marketers and managers, if we foresee that there is going to be more sophisticated 
use of customers’ data, which it would translate to having more technology into the store (i.e. 
from check-out scanners and digital signage), and if we recognize that shoppers forget what 
they came into the store for, we would significantly improve our retail brand by increasing 
customer service and subsequently brand loyalty. For instance, if a beer pub knows that 
whenever people buys booze they also purchase snacks, the pub’s manager should try to put 
these two products close to each other. In the end, we would be able to improve our 
customers’ database and to design tailored solutions to support our clients. After all, as 
researchers or marketers or managers, we are all working towards reaching new discoveries 





















(Figure1, adjusted from McDaniel and Einstein, 2007, p. 12). 
 
 
Experiment one appendices: 
 
The experimenter’s approach to participants in experiment one (in text): 
 
PHASE1 – presentation and introduction 
<Hi, my name is Enrico and I am a Master student in Catòlica and Lancaster 
University. I am conducting an experiment that tries to test the accuracy of memory 
predictions in the future, and so memory without any use of external aids. Would 
you like to participate at my experiment?>. 
 
<I will need to collect some of your personal data like age, gender, profession and 
nationality too at the end of the research. These information will be used for research 
purposes only. Do you agree to this condition?> 
 
PHASE2 – first data collection and memory predictions 
<Thank you very much already for accepting. Now, I will kindly ask you to list me 
ten day-to-day tasks you intend to perform in the coming seven days. I will take note 
of them but you won’t be allowed to write them down now, nor later>. 
 
<How many of the 10 tasks you listed you think you will be able to remember (right 
now, 10 minutes from now, 30 minutes from now, 60 minutes from now, 1 day from 
now)?> 
(Group1 will be asked a second time to list the ten tasks at this phase) 
 
Retention interval (Excluded group1 which has been examined right after PHASE2, 
t=0). <Thank you for your participation in the first phase of the study. (10 minutes 
from now, 30 minutes from now, 60 minutes from now, 1 day from now) I will ask 
you to list the 10 tasks again. In the meantime, you can do whatever you want/need 
to do. But please do not use a reminder to remember the tasks. 
 
PHASE3 – second data collection and memory performance 
<10 (or 30, 60, one day)  minutes of time that I asked you to wait just passed. Now, I 
will kindly ask you to list again the 10 tasks which you mentioned me before, in any 
order you wish. You can’t use any memory aid now either>. 
 
<Thank you very much for your participation so far. Would you please tell me your 
age, gender (probably un-necessary to ask), profession, nationality?> 
<Thank you again>. 
1. Participants kept busy with an ongoing task 
 
2. They are given some distraction before the ongoing task starts 
 
3. Performance is measured by the proportion of successful trials  
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Demographic data - 26 Stem-and-Leaf Plot: (Table0a – SPSS) 
 
 
Group = 1.0 (Immediate) 
 
 Frequency    Stem &  Leaf 
 
     2.00       18 .  00 
     3.00       19 .  000 
     2.00       20 .  00 
     4.00       21 .  0000 
     8.00       22 .  00000000 
     3.00       23 .  000 
     4.00       24 .  0000 
     1.00       25 .  0 
     2.00       26 .  00 
     1.00       27 .  0 
 
 Stem width:       1.0 
 Each leaf:       1 case(s) 
 
Group = 2.0 (10 minutes) 
 
 Frequency    Stem &  Leaf 
 
     2.00       19 .  00 
     3.00       20 .  000 
     6.00       21 .  000000 
     5.00       22 .  00000 
     3.00       23 .  000 
     4.00       24 .  0000 
     3.00       25 .  000 
     2.00       26 .  00 
     2.00 Extremes    (>=33.0) 
 
 Stem width:       1.0 
 Each leaf:       1 case(s) 
 
Group = 3.0 (30 minutes) 
 
 Frequency    Stem &  Leaf 
 
     2.00       18 .  00 
     5.00       19 .  00000 
    10.00       20 .  0000000000 
     5.00       21 .  00000 
     6.00       22 .  000000 
     1.00       23 .  0 
      .00       24 . 
     1.00       25 .  0 
 
 Stem width:       1.0 
 Each leaf:       1 case(s) 
 
Group = 4.0 (60 minutes) 
 
 Frequency    Stem &  Leaf 
 
     1.00       18 .  0 
     5.00       19 .  00000 
     6.00       20 .  000000 
     6.00       21 .  000000 
     6.00       22 .  000000 
     1.00       23 .  0 
      .00       24 . 
     1.00       25 .  0 
     4.00 Extremes    (>=26.0) 
 
 Stem width:       1.0 
 Each leaf:       1 case(s) 
 
Group = 5.0 (one day) 
 
 Frequency    Stem &  Leaf 
 
     1.00       21 .  0 
     1.00       22 .  0 
     4.00       23 .  0000 
     2.00       24 .  00 
     4.00       25 .  0000 
     5.00       26 .  00000 
     3.00       27 .  000 
     1.00       28 .  0 
 
 Stem width:       1.0 







        (Table0b – SPSS). 
   
 





Condition Immediate 30 
10 min 30 
30 min 30 
60 min 30 
1 day 21 
 











Dependent Variable:   Memory Performance   
Condition Mean Std. Deviation N 
Immediate 8.900 1.1552 30 
10 min 8.667 1.2685 30 
30 min 8.233 .9714 30 
60 min 7.667 1.3979 30 
1 day 7.905 1.6403 21 
Total 8.298 1.3456 141 
 
                       (Table2 – SPSS). 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects: 
 
Dependent Variable:   Memory Performance 
Source 
Type III Sum 





 4 7.570 4.612 .002 .119 
Intercept 9458.815 1 9458.815 5763.190 .000 .977 




Error 223.210 136 1.641    
Total 9962.000 141     
Corrected Total 253.489 140     
a. R Squared = .119 (Adjusted R Squared = .094) 


















Dependent Variable:   Total Aggregate Predictions   
Condition Mean Std. Deviation N 
Immediate 6.900 1.8261 30 
10 min 6.600 1.3797 30 
30 min 6.767 1.3047 30 
60 min 




Total 7.028 1.5489 141 
 
                        (Table4 – SPSS). 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects: 
 
Dependent Variable:   Total Aggregate Predictions 
Source 
Type III Sum 






 4 5.075 2.187 .074 .060 
Intercept 6893.720 1 6893.720 2970.812 .000 .956 
Time 20.301 4 5.075 2.187 .074 .060 
Error 315.586 136 2.320    
Total 7301.000 141     
Corrected Total 335.887 140     
a. R Squared = .060 (Adjusted R Squared = .033) 
 




















Immediate 7.433 1.7750 30 
10 min 8.500 1.4563 30 
30 min 8.200 1.5844 30 
60 min 8.733 1.6595 30 
1 day 
8.952 1.4310 21 
Total 8.326 1.6583 141 
 
                   (Table6 – SPSS). 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects: 
 
Dependent Variable:  Sum item-by-item Predictions 
Source 
Type III Sum 





 4 9.627 3.779 .006 
Intercept 9664.602 1 9664.602 3793.478 .000 
Time 38.507 4 9.627 3.779 .006 
Error 346.486 136 2.548 
  
Total 10160.000 141 
   
Corrected Total 384.993 140 
   
a. R Squared = .100 (Adjusted R Squared = .074) 
 
(Table7 – SPSS). 
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Experiment two appendices: 
 
The experimenter’s approach to participants in experiment two (in text): 
 
PHASE1 – presentation and introduction 
<Hi everyone. Thank you for coming to this post-season basketball session. I am 
currently conducting an experiment for my dissertation that aims at testing the 
accuracy of memory predictions in the future, and so memory without any use of 
external aids. Would you like to participate at my experiment?>. 
 
Each player was picked and asked by the researcher to participate, although the 
entire team had been initially approached in a gathering moment. 
 
<I will need to collect some of your personal data like age, gender, profession and 
nationality too at the end of the research. These information will be used for research 
purposes only. Do you agree to this condition?> 
 
PHASE2 – experiment presentation and description 
<Thank you very much already for accepting. Now, I will kindly ask you guys to 
form one team together. I am going to teach you now about twelve pieces of 
information about basketball fundamentals. These twelve pieces are divided in three 
groups: one about the use of hands, one about the use of feet, and one about the use 
of body when playing the game. One mandatory requirement you must respect is: do 
not talk with each other or anyone else about what I am going to tell you soon. Do 
not rehearse or cheat. Ok?>. 
 
Then, description of the twelve pieces of information followed, Figure#. The order 
of the information varied between groups as described in the main text. 
 
PHASE3 – first data collection and memory performance 
<Please, take now one piece of paper and pen. Write down your names and four 
numbers that should represent how many tasks I gave you, you think you will recall. 
The first three refer to each set of information you received. Please, write your 
predictions in order with the order of the  information sets you received. They should 
be three numbers comprised between zero to four. The fourth and last number should 
represent your total memory prediction. A number between zero and twelve. Once 
you have finished please give me back pens and papers. Take now another piece of 
paper and please list the tasks of the first set you received. Please, always put your 
name on it. Once you have finished please give me back pens and papers and go 
playing. I will stop you when ten minutes will be passed. Thank you>. 
 
Retention interval – 10 minutes. 
PHASE4 – second data collection and memory performance 
<Ok guys, please stop playing. Pick up a piece of paper and a pen, write your name 
and please list the tasks of the second set you received. Once you have finished 
please give me back pens and papers and go playing. I will stop you when other 
twenty minutes will be passed. Thank you>. 
 
Retention interval – 30 minutes. 
PHASE5 – second data collection and memory performance 
<Ok guys, please stop playing. Pick up a piece of paper and a pen, write your name 
and please list the tasks of the third set you received. Once you have finished please 
give me back pens and papers and go playing. The experiment is finished. Please do 





Interaction between memory (predictions vs. performance: factor1), time interval (immediate 
vs. 10 min vs. 30 min: factor 2), and body instructions (hands, feet, body: condi1): 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts: 
 
Measure:   Interaction   





Square F Sig. 
factor1 Linear  7,037 1 7,037 4,552 ,054 
factor1 * condi1 Linear  3,456 2 1,728 1,118 ,359 
Error(factor1) Linear  18,548 12 1,546   
factor2  Linear 3,588 1 3,588 9,008 ,011 
Quadratic ,010 1 ,010 ,026 ,874 
factor2 * condi1  Linear 1,924 2 ,962 2,415 ,131 
Quadratic 
,315 2 
,158 ,407 ,675 
Error(factor2)  Linear 4,780 12 ,398   
Quadratic 4,652 12 ,388   
factor1 * factor2 Linear Linear 2,129 1 2,129 7,273 ,019 
Quadratic ,116 1 ,116 ,285 ,603 
factor1 * factor2 
* condi1 
Linear Linear 1,877 2 ,939 3,206 ,077 
Quadratic ,005 2 ,003 ,006 ,994 
Error(factor1*fac
tor2) 
Linear Linear 3,513 12 ,293   
Quadratic 4,868 12 ,406   
 




















Univariate effect of time interval (immediate vs. 10 min vs. 30 min: factor 2) on memory 
predictions and interaction with body instructions (hands, feet, body: condi1): 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts: 
 
Measure:   Memory Predictions 
Source factor1 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F 
Sig. 
factor1 Linear ,095 1 ,095 ,417 ,531 
Quadratic ,029 1 ,029 ,207 ,657 
factor1 * 
condi1 
Linear ,501 2 ,251 1,103 ,363 
Quadratic ,120 2 ,060 ,437 ,656 
Error(factor1) Linear 2,726 12 ,227     
Quadratic 1,653 12 ,138     
 




Effect of time interval (immediate vs. 10 min vs. 30 min: factor 2) on memory performance 
and interaction with body instructions (hands, feet, body: condi1): 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrast: 
 
Measure:   Memory Performance 
Source factor2 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
factor2 Linear 5,623 1 5,623 12,120 ,005 
Quadratic ,097 1 ,097 ,148 ,707 
factor2 * 
condi1 
Linear 3,300 2 1,650 3,557 ,061 
Quadratic ,200 2 ,100 ,153 ,860 
Error(factor2) Linear 5,567 12 ,464   
Quadratic 7,867 12 ,656   
 










Interaction between memory (predictions vs. performance: factor1), time interval (immediate 






















Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts: 
 
 
Measure:   Interaction   
Source factor1 factor2 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
factor1 Linear  ,028 1 ,028 ,019 ,893 
factor1 * years of. Exp. Linear  1,910 1 1,910 1,283 ,279 
Error(factor1) Linear  17,857 12 1,488   
factor2  Linear 1,398 1 1,398 2,676 ,128 
Quadratic ,043 1 ,043 ,106 ,750 
factor2 * years of Exp.  Linear ,154 1 ,154 ,294 ,597 
Quadratic ,075 1 ,075 ,183 ,676 
Error(factor2)  Linear 6,269 12 ,522   
Quadratic 4,891 12 ,408   
factor1 * factor2 Linear Linear 2,888 1 2,888 15,900 ,002 
Quadratic ,023 1 ,023 ,059 ,812 
factor1 * factor2 * 
years of Exp. 
Linear Linear 1,243 1 1,243 6,842 ,023 
Quadratic ,006 1 ,006 ,015 ,906 
Error(factor1*factor2) Linear Linear 2,180 12 ,182   
Quadratic 4,613 12 ,384   
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• Def. Remembering to
perform an action (i.e. a 
purchase) in the future*
• It influences consumers’ 
Decision Making
• It influences their Planning
Some facts
• Consumers are 
overconfident about their
memory abilities
• Very Short-time intervals
are sufficient to make
consumers forget their
intentions
• Consumers more likely
forget specific tasks





            (Slide1 – PowerPoint). 
 
 
On the digital Marketing side:
Behavioural targeting
• Def. Technologies and 
practices aimed at 
enhancing the effectiveness 
of advertising online*
• It creates opportunities for 
ad customisation
• It allows to collect precious 
information for a single 
customer
HOW?
• By adoption of powerful 
database marketing 
methodologies 
• By providing online loyalty 
schemes 
WHY?
• Consumers spend alot of
time in online shopping







            (Slide2 – PowerPoint). 
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On the offline Marketing side:
Shopper marketing
• Def. The understanding of 
how one’s own target 
consumers behave as 
shoppers *
• It creates opportunities for 
customer service 
customisation
• It leads to successful 
promotional campaigns
HOW?
• By using customer’s 
knowledge and customer 
service
• By developing systems that 
prevent consumers from 
forgetting
WHY?
• shoppers forget what they 
are shopping for
• It builds brand equity
• Increase customer loyalty










10.    References 
 
 
Alterman, R. (1996). Everyday memory and activity. In Koriat, A., & Goldsmith, M. (1996). 
Memory metaphors and the real-life/laboratory controversy: correspondence versus 
storehouse conceptions of memory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 19, pp. 189-190. 
 
Anderson, N. H. (1996). Functional memory requires a quite different value metaphor. In 
Koriat, A., & Goldsmith, M. (1996). Memory metaphors and the real-life/laboratory 
controversy: correspondence versus storehouse conceptions of memory. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, vol. 19, pp. 189-190. 
 
Anderson, J. R., & Bower, G. H. (1973). Human associative memory. Washington, D.C.: 
Winston. 
 
Babutsidze, Z. (2007). How do consumer make choices? A summary of evidence from 
Marketing and Psychology. UNU-MERIT Working Papers, ISSN 1871-9872, pp. 1-24. 
 
Baddeley, A. (1986). Working memory. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Baddeley, A. (1992). Working memory. Science, New Series, vol. 255, n. 5044, pp. 556-559. 
 
Banaji, M. R., & Crowder, R. G. (1989). The bankruptcy of everyday memory. American 
Psychologist, vol. 44, pp. 1185-1193.  
 
Begg, I., Vinski, E., Frankovich, L., & Holgate, B. (1991). Generating makes words 
memorable, but so does effective reading. Memory and Cognition, vol. 19, n. 5, pp. 487-497. 
 
Bernard, H. R. (1998). Method and methods in anthropology. In Bernard, H. R. (Eds.). 
Handbook of methods in cultural anthropology. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, pp. 9-10. 
 
Braum-LaTour, K. A., LaTour, M. S., Pickrell, J. E., Loftus, E. F. (2004). How and when 
advertising can influence memory for consumer experience. Journal of Advertising, vol. 33, 
n. 4, pp. 7-25. 
 
Deloitte Research (2007). Shopper marketing: capturing a shopper’s mind, heart and wallet. 
New York: Deloitte Development, PLC. 
 
Dunlosky, J., & Metcalfe, J. (2009). Metacognition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 
Inc. 
 
Cohen, G., & Conway, M. A. (2008). Memory in the real world. Third edition. London: 
Psychology Press. 
 
Erev, I., Wallsten, T. S., & Budescu, D. V. (1994). Simultaneous over- and underconfidence: 
the role of error in judgment processes. Psychological Review, vol. 101, n. 3, pp. 519-527. 
 




Fernandes, D., Puntoni, S., Van Osselaer, S. M. J., & Cowley, E. (2015).  When and why we 
forget to buy. Journal of Consumer Psychology, forthcoming. 
 
Flint, D. (2011). The future of retail is whatever and whenever shoppers want. The Hub, 
March/April, pp. 7-10. 
 
Gero, J. S. (2008). A cognitively-based constructivist approach to memory and reasoning. 
AAAI Fall Symposium: Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architectures, vol. AAAI, p. 64. 
 
Goldsmith, M., Koriat, A., & Weinberg-Eliezer, A. (2002). Strategic regulation of grain size 
in memory reporting. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, vol. 131, n. 1, pp. 73-95. 
 
Gollwitzer, P. M., & Sheeran, P. (2009). Self-regulation of consumer decision making and 
behavior: the role of implementation intentions. Journal of Consumer Psychology, vol. 19, pp. 
593-607. 
 
Goschke, T., & Kuhl, J. (1993). Representation of intentions: persisting activation in memory. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, vol. 19, pp. 1211-
1226. 
 
Graf, P., & Uttl, B. (2001). Prospective memory: a new focus for research. Consciousness and 
Cognition: an International Journal, vol. 10, pp. 437-450. 
 
Guynn, M. J. (2003). A two-process model of strategic monitoring in event-based prospective 
memory: activation/retrieval mode and checking. International Journal of Psychology, vol. 
38, pp. 245-256. 
 
Guynn, M. J., McDaniel, M. A., Strosser, G. L., Ramirez, J. M., Hinrichs, E. L., & Hayes, K. 
H. (2005). Relational and item-specific influences on generate-recognize processes in recall. 
In McDaniel, M. A., Einstein, G. O. (2007). Prospective memory: an overview and synthesis  
of an emerging field. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Pubblications, Inc. 
 
Hauser, J. R., Urban, G. L., Liberali, G., & Braun, M. (2009). Website Morphing. Marketing 
Science, vol. 28, n. 2, pp. 202-223. 
 
Hauser, J. R., & Wernerfelt, B. (1990). An evaluation cost model of consideration sets. 
Journal of Consumer Research, vol. 38, pp. 393-408. 
 
Häubl, G., & Trifts, V. (2000). Consumer decision making in online shopping environments: 
the effects of interactive decision aids. Marketing Science, vol. 19, n. 1, pp. 4-21. 
 
Hicks, J. L., Marsh, R. L., & Russel, E. J. (2000). The properties of retention intervals and 
their affect on retaining prospective memories. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, vol. 26, pp. 1160-1169. 
 
Jacoby, L. L., & Hollingshead, A. (1990). Toward a generate/recognize model of performance 





James, M. (2006). Behavioural targeting, can online advertising deliver in 2006? Journal of 
Direct, Data and Digital Marketing Practice, vol. 7, pp. 332-343. 
 
Janiszeweski, C., Kuo, A., & Tavassoli, N. (2012). The Influence of Selective Attention and 
Inattention to Products on Subsequent Choice. Journal of Consumer Research, vol. 40, p. 
1258-1274. 
 
Kelley, C. M., & Jacoby, L. L. (1996). Adult egocentrism: subjective experience versus 
analytic bases for judgment. Journal of Memory and Language, vol. 35, pp. 157-175. 
 
Kim, B. K., Zauberman, G., & Bettman, J. R. (2012). Space, time, and intertemporal 
preferences. Journal of Consumer Research, vol. 39, n. 4, pp. 687-880. 
 
Kinash, S. (2010). Seeing beyond blindness. USA: Information Age Publishing. 
 
Koriat, A., & Bjork, R. A., Sheffer, L. & Bar, S. K. (2004). Predicting one’s own forgetting: 
the role of experience-based and theory-based processes. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, vol. 133, n. 4, pp. 643-656. 
 
Koriat, A., & Bjork, R. A. (2005). Illusions of competence in monitoring one’s knowledge 
during study. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, vol. 
31, n. 2, pp. 187-194. 
 
Koriat, A., & Bjork, R. A. (2006). Mending metacognitive illusions: a comparison of 
mnemonic-based and theory-based procedures. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory and Cognition, vol. 32, n. 5, pp. 1133-1145. 
 
Koriat, A., & Goldsmith, M. (1996). Memory metaphors and the real-life/laboratory 
controversy: correspondence versus storehouse conceptions of memory. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, vol. 19, pp. 167-228. 
 
Koriat, A., Ma’ayan, H. (2005). The effects of encoding fluency and retrieval fluency on 
judgments of learning. Journal of Memory and Language, vol. 52, pp. 478-492. 
 
Koriat, A., Ma’ayan, H., Nussinson, R. (2006). The intricate relationship between monitoring 
and control in metacognition: lessons for the cause-and-effect relation between subjective 
experience and behavior. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, vol. 135, n. 1, pp. 
36-69. 
 
Kornell, N., & Bjork, R. A. (2009). A stability bias in human memory: overestimating 
remembering and underestimating learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 
vol. 138, n. 4, pp. 449-468. 
 
Kornell, N., & Metcalfe, J. (2006). Study efficacy and the region of proximal learning 
framework. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, vol. 32, 
n. 3, pp. 609-622. 
 
Kramer, T., & Yoon, S. (2007). Approach-avoidance motivation and the use of affect as 




Kvavilashvili, L. (1987). Remembering intention as a distinct form of memory. British 
Journal of Psychology, vol. 78, pp. 507-518. 
 
Kvavilashvili, L., & Ellis, J. (2004). Ecological validity and twenty years of real-
life/laboratory controversy in memory research: A critical (and historical) review. History and 
Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 6, pp. 59-80. 
 
Kvavilashvili, L., & Ellis, J. (2006). Varieties of intention: some distinctions and 
classifications. In Brandimonte, M., Einstein, G., & McDaniel, M. A. (Eds.). Prospective 
memory: Theory and Applications, (pp. 23-51). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 
Marsh, R. L., Hicks, J. L., & Landau, J. D. (1998). An investigation of everyday prospective 
memory. Memory and Cognition, vol. 26, pp. 633-643. 
 
McDaniel, M. A., Einstein, G. O. (2000). Strategic and automatic processes in prospective 
memory retrieval: a multiprocess framework. Applied Cognitive Psychology, vol. 14, pp. 127-
144. 
 
McDaniel, M. A., Einstein, G. O. (2007). Prospective memory: an overview and synthesis  of 
an emerging field. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Pubblications, Inc. 
 
Meyvis, T., Levav, J., & Ratner, R. K. (2010). Why don’t we learn to accurately forecast 
feelings? How misremembering our predictions blinds us to past forecasting errors. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, vol. 139, n. 4, pp. 579-589. 
 
Miele, D. B., Finn, B., & Molden, D. C. (2011). Does easily learned mean easily 
remembered? It depends on your beliefs about intelligence. Psychological Science, vol. 22, n. 
3, pp. 320-324.  
 
Miller, G. A. (1994). The magical number seven, plus or minus two: some limits on our 
capacity for processing information. Psychological Review, vol. 101, n. 2, pp. 343-352. 
 
Mitra, A., & Lynch, J. G. (1995). Toward a reconciliation of market power and information 
theories of advertising effects on price elasticity. Journal of Consumer Research, vol. 21, pp. 
644-659. 
 
Morris, P. E., Gruneberg, M. (1994). Theoretical aspects of memory. Second edition. London 
and New York: Routledge. 
 
Moscovitch, M. (1994). Memory and working with memory: evaluation of a component 
process model and comparisons with other models. In McDaniel, M. A., Einstein, G. O. 
(2007). Prospective memory: an overview and synthesis  of an emerging field. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Pubblications, Inc. 
 
Nedungadi, P. (1990). Recall and consumer consideration sets: influencing choice without 
altering brand evaluations. Journal of Consumer Research, vol. 17, pp. 263-276. 
 
Nelson, T. O., & Dunlosky, J. (1991). When people’s judgments of learning (JOLs) are 
extremely accurate at predicting subsequent recall: the “delayed-JOL effect”. Psychological 




Nelson, T. O., & Narens, L. (1990). Metamemory: a theoretical framework and new findings. 
The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, vol. 26, pp. 125-173. 
 
Pechmann, C., & Stewart, D. W. (1990). The effects of comparative advertising on attention, 
memory, and purchase intentions. Journal of Consumer Research, vol. 17, n. 2,pp. 180-191.  
 
Perkett, C. (2010). Don’t abandon traditional marketing methods: integrate and interact. In 
MarketingProfs.com, http://www.marketingprofs.com/opinions/2010/22888/don-t-abandon-
traditional-marketing-methods-integrate-and-interact, accessed August, 2015. 
 
Piaget, J., & Inhelder, B. (1973). Memory and Intelligence. London, Routledge & K. Paul. 
 
Prohaska, V., Brown, N. R., & Belli, R. F. (1998). Forward telescoping: the question matters. 
Memory, vol. 6, n. 4, pp. 455-465. 
 
Reina, V. F., & Brainerd, C. J. (1995). Fuzzy-trace theory: an interim synthesis. Learning and 
individual differences, vol. 7, n. 1, pp. 1-75. 
 
Rhodes, M. G., & Tauber, S. K. (2011). The influence of delaying judgments of learning on 
metacognitive accuracy: a meta-analytic review. Psychological Bulletin, vol. 137, n. 1, pp. 
131-148. 
 
Rose, N. S., McDaniel, M. A., Rendell, P. G., Aberle, I., & Kliegel, M. (2010). Age and 
Individual Differences in Prospective Memory During a “Virtual Week”: The Roles of 
Working Memory, Vigilance, Task Regularity, and Cue Focality. Psychology and Aging, vol. 
25, n. 3, pp. 595-605. 
 
Shankar, V., Inman, J. J., Mantrala, M., Kelley, E, & Rizley, R. (2011). Innovations in 
shopper marketing: current insights and future research issues. Journal of Retailing, vol. 87, 
pp. 29-42. 
 
Simmons, J. P., Nelson, L. D., & Simonshon, U. (2011). False-positive psychology: 
undisclosed flexibility in data collection and analysis allows presenting anything as 
significant. Psychological Science, vol. 22, n. 11, pp. 1359-1366. 
 
Simon, H. E. (1990). Invariants of human behavior. Annual Review of Psychology, vol. 41, 
pp. 1-20. 
 
Simpson, D. (2012). Truth, perspectivism, and philosophy.  E-logos: Electronic Journal for 
Philosophy, n. 2, pp. 1-16. 
 
Smith, E. E., Kosslyn, S. M. (2009). Cognitive psychology: mind and brain. Second edition. 
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice Hall. 
 
Smith, R. E., & Bayen, U. J. (2004). A multinomial model of event-based prospective 





Tulving, E. (1993). What is episodic memory? Current Directions in Psychological Science, 
vol. 2, n. 3, pp. 67-70. 
Willis, J. (2006). Research-Based Strategies to Ignite Student Learning. Alexandria, VA: 
Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development. 
Wilkins, A. J. (1979). Remembering to remember. In McDaniel, M. A., Einstein, G. O. 
(2007). Prospective memory: an overview and synthesis  of an emerging field. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Pubblications, Inc. 
 
Winkielman, P., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2001). Mind at ease puts a smile on the face: 
Psychophysiological evidence that processing facilitation elicits positive affect. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 81, pp. 989-1000. 
 
Winkielman, P., Schwarz, N., Fazendeiro, T., & Reber, R. (2003). The hedonic marking of 
processing fluency: implications for evaluative judgment. In J. Musch & K. C. Klauer (Eds.). 
The psychology of evaluation: Affective processes in cognition and emotion (pp. 189–217). 
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
 
Winograd, E. (1994). Naturalistic approaches to the study of memory. In Morris, P. E., 
Gruneberg, M. (1994). Theoretical aspects of memory. Second edition. London and New 
York: Routledge. 
 
Wyer Jr., R. S., Hung, I. W., & Jiang, Y. (2008). Visual and verbal processing strategies in 
comprehension and judgment. Journal of Consumer Psychology, vol. 18, pp. 244-257. 
 
Yaniv, I., & Foster, D. P. (1995). Graininess of judgment under uncertainty: an accuracy-
informativeness trade-off. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, vol. 124, n. 4, pp. 
424-432. 
 
Zauberman, G., Kim, B. K., Malkoc, S. A., & Bettman, J. R. (2009). Discounting time and 
time discounting: subjective time perception and intertemporal preferences. Journal of 
Marketing Research, vol. 46, n. 4, pp. 543-556. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
